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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to set up a complete ex-ante evaluation procedure to support Decision 
Makers in designing more efficient and effective agri-environmental contracts, through an integrated 
modelling of elements of private and public decision making. Ex-ante comparison of policy design 
options in terms of overall effectiveness requires both simulations of farmers’ behaviour and 
evaluation of the farms simulations outcomes. An intermediate step is the aggregation of single farms 
impacts at territorial level, in order to identify the aggregate impact of each alternative. Alternatives 
are several contract design, based on different levels of payments. Farm level analysis is based on a 
real options approach including in the simulations the timing of choice and the uncertainty in the 
future about price and decoupled payments. Aggregate policy impact is identified through the 
quantification of economic, social and environmental impacts at territorial level and the weights are 
elicited with Multiple-Criteria Robust Interactive Decision Analysis (MCRID). Simulations in the case 
study show that relevant opportunities to improve policy design are available. Multicriteria Analysis is 
then used to aggregate impacts of many criteria, including not only effects on the environment, but 
also economic and social impacts. 
 





The Agri-Environmental Schemes are starting their new programs for the period 2007-2013, under 
regulation 1698/2005. In this regulation the European Commission has confirmed the possibility for 
each Member State to design and implement agri-environmental schemes at national, regional or local 
level. The design step is a fundamental phase in the policy cycle and it is based on the definition of the 
type and the dosage of policy instrument, choice of the target, choice of addressees and choice of the 
regulation area (Latacz-Lohmann, 2001). Policy effectiveness has strong relationships with 
implementation and contract design phases (Latacz-Lohmann, 2001). Accuracy in the design and in 
the creation of policies can take into account the needs of all stakeholders involved and can guarantee 
an efficient and effective program. Furthermore the design of contracts for the production of agri-
environmental goods has the meaning to generate participation and to invest in environmental goods, 
without generating distortive effects on the market (Swinbank, 2000; Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge, 
2001; Dobbs and Pretty, 2004). 
The objective of this paper is to develop a complete ex-ante evaluation procedure to support Decision 
Maker (DM) in designing more efficient and effective agri-environmental contracts, through an 
integrated modelling of elements of private and public decision making. Ex-ante comparison of policy 
design options in terms of overall effectiveness requires both simulation of farmers’ behaviour and 
evaluation of the farms simulations outcomes. An intermediate step is the aggregation of single farm 
impacts at territorial level, in order to identify the aggregate impact of each alternative. Alternatives 
are several contract design options, based on different levels of payments for introduction and 
maintenance. Farm level analysis is realized using a land allocation model, based on a real options 
approach. The model is able to include in the simulations the timing of choice and the uncertainty 
about the future about price of agricultural products and decoupled payments. Public analysis is based 
on the evaluation of the aggregate farms’ impacts of several contract alternatives based on interactive   3
multicriteria analysis, where weights are elicited using the Multiple-Criteria Robust Interactive 
Decision Analysis (MCRID) approach. The model is applied to a case study area in Ferrara Province 
(NUTS 3). 
The structure of the paper is the following: in section 2 some background about common agricultural 
policy and agri-environmental schemes is provided; in section 3 the methodology is presented; in 
section 4 the case study and the model description are presented; results and conclusions are reported 
in chapter 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
 
2. Common Agricultural Policy, markets and Agri-environmental schemes 
 
The modelling of participation in agri-environmental schemes, indeed, is a function of many aspects: 
farm and farmer characteristics; amount of payments, lengths of contract and the commitments 
required. Furthermore the context on with farmer makes a decision and the information available and 
the expectations about the future of market trends and other future policy have strong relevance in the 
quantification of the uptake. Before dealing with the model itself, we briefly analyse the framework 
connecting such issues. 
The linkage between common agricultural policy and agri-environmental schemes is emphasized 
either with the cross-compliance mechanism and the proposals for CAP revision under health check 
process. Cross-compliance represents a relevant topic in the EU agenda (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007). The core content of cross-compliance is the definition of compulsory standards 
of environmental and health that each beneficiary of the single farm payment must be compliant with 
(European Commission, 2003). From the viewpoint of rural development programs, conditionality 
represents the baseline from which to quantify the cost of commitments required for agri-
environmental schemes (Reg. 1698/2005). Furthermore, the singles payments are included in the 
justification of the amount of payments as income foregone for landscape elements and for other AESs 
consuming lands. From the point of view of decoupled payments, agri-environmental payments are 
excluded from the quantification of number of rights and also from the identification of eligible 
surface, as well of the calculations of the amount of single payments. 
Investments in landscape elements can be seen as specific investments, due to zero salvage value that 
the goods can have outside the contract. Literature concerning specific investments is rather wide (see 
Williamson, 1996 for the formalization of specific investments linking to the transactions costs). 
Following Sanchez (2003), specific investments represent a strategy for obtaining competitive 
advantage in the present or in the future, but at the same time reducing the flexibility of the firm in 
front of uncertain situations. Furthermore, it exists a trade-off between investment in landscape 
elements and other agri-environmental schemes consuming area and the maintenance of enough 
surfaces for benefiting of the single payments. This trade-off increases when farmer’s choices are 
concerned with long term investments, and are made under uncertain scenarios in both future policy 
and market prices. Increased uncertainty in price is expected as a consequence of indications of 
reductions of mechanisms of price support, which will expose farms to the international markets. At 
farm level, the timing on which realize investments is characterized by changing amount of 
information about the uncertain variables available at the moment of the choice. This may attribute a 
value to the choice of waiting to take decisions, when variability of decision parameters may be 





The objective of this paper is to develop an aggregate ex-ante evaluation of different contract design 
options, for facilitating the DM in the policy design phase. The methodology (Figure 1) is divisible in 
two levels: first, analysis of farmers’ behaviours in front of new contract design options for the 
provision of landscape elements; second, public analysis of the choice, in order to identify dominated 
policy alternatives. Combining both elements of private and public decision making it is possible to 
outline strategies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of agri-environmental contracts. 
 
Figure 1. Methodology applied 
 
Farmers’ behaviours analysis has been developed using a land allocations model that determines the 
participation in front of new contracts for the provision of landscape elements. Alternatives considered 
are different ways to implements landscape contracts, changing the amount of payments for both 
introduction and maintenance phases. 
Farmer’s choice is determined by the maximum expected value synthesized in equation 1 (Mastens 
and Soussier 2002; Peerlings and Polman, 2004): 
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Choice of policy options 
Multicriteria Analysis   5
a G = better alternative to the contract provided; 
l V , 
a V  = expected value of transactions respectively of agri-environmental contracts (l) and to the 
better alternative to the production of agri-environmental goods (a); 
* G = farmer’s choice. 
Each farmer’s choice ( * G ) determines an impact vector 
v
lh i , measured through economic, social and 
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Where: 
v
lh i  = farms performance generated by alternative l;  
h = 1…,H farm type 
v = economic (eco), social (soc) and environmental (env) criteria; 
h s  = weights of farm h on the territory. 
The utility value (
i
l u ) is generated by the aggregation of weight i w  and impacts  il I , for each v 
criterion and for each l alternative (Guitouni and Martel, 1998). Impacts I derives from the weighted 
sum of all farm impacts (
v
lh i ). 
The methodology for eliciting weights, as expression of relative importance of objectives for the DM, 
is based on Multiple-Criteria Robust Interactive Decision analysis (MCRID) from Moskowitz et al. 
(1992). 
The Multicriteria problem can be identified as an aggregation of the utility from single criteria based 
on the performance for each criterion v of one alternative aj. 
() [] () ∑ =
m
v
lv v l a u w a U E
         
(3) 
Where: 
l = 1,..,n alternative; 
v =1,…m criterion. 
() lv a u  = utility for the DM due to the impacts of alternative l on the criterion v; 
v w  = weight of the criterion v; 
In hierarchical MCA, weights play a central role. In fact, total utility function at k level comes from 
the aggregations of several utility functions at k-1 level (economic, social and environmental criteria). 
The impacts presented at level k, are measured through economic, social and environmental criteria. 
Each criterion presents a sub-set of indicators (level k-1). Indicators belonging to economic criteria are 
the farm profits, the payments by local administrations and the value of investments in landscape 
elements. Social indicators are both family and external labour and the numbers of beneficiary of the 
landscape contracts (participants). Environmental indicators are the hectares of the landscape elements 
created with AESs, differentiated in hedgerows, small woods and ponds. Adopting hierarchical MCA 
implies to pay high attention to the preferences inter-level and intra-level. Multicriteria approach used 
is based on an interactive process with the DM; the information collected from DM is able to reduce 
weaknesses during weights elicitation phases.   6
The key strategy of this methodology is in structuring the preferences expressed by the DM as a linear 
programming optimizations problem; in this way, it is possible to elicit the weight as an interval of 
maximimum and minimum amount that can validate the DM choice (Hayashi, 2000). The 
minimization and the maximizations of DM’ preference for each criterion can be interpreted as upper 
and lower bound values within which the value of the importance of each criterion can be considered 
consistent. Several other methods are used in literature for eliciting weights, basically those methods 
can be classify into interval point scale, or into ratio scale (Salo, 1995). 
The methodology applies as follows. The first step starts asking to the DM the ranking of the 
importance for the criteria at k-1 level and the alternatives strictly preferred for the same criterion 
considered. Identification of dominant alternatives is based on paired comparison. The DM’s 
preference can be formalized as: 
1 1 − − k
m
k
v w w φ  for  v ≠ m            ( 4 )  
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          ( 5 )  
Where 
1 − k
v w = the weight of  criterion v at the k-1 level; 
1 − k
m w  = the weight of criterion m at the k-1 level; 
() [ ]
1 − k
l a U E  = expected utility functions for alternative l;  
() [ ]
1 − k
n a U E  = expected utility functions for alternative n.  
Structuring the identified preferences as linear programming model and through maximizing and 
minimizing the weight of each criterion, it is possible to identify the maximum and minimum value of 
the weights able to verify the structure of preferences revealed by the DM. Repeating the step for the 
other k levels, we are able to identify weights for each criterion present in the same level. Following 
Arrow (1951) the verbally expressed preferences can be rewritten as: 
0
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With both maximization and minimizations of each weight of the same liner programming problem it 
is possible to identify the DM’s local weight (level k-1) (Moskowitz et al., 1992). 
1   min max/
− k
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Where A is an m x n matrix containing the constraints, wv is a n-dimension vector of weights and b is a 
m-dimensional vector of the right-hand sides for the k-1 level. D expresses the DM preference matrix. 
The aggregate utility at the k-level the impact is obtained through a weighted sum of utility of the 
impact at k-1 level. The aggregations is based on maximum (7) and minimum (8) weighted sum of the 
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The maximum ( v w ) and the minimum weights ( v w ) are obtained from the minimizations and the 
maximization process. Restarting the second interactions with the DM (k level), the DM provides a 
new ranking of the criterion based on they importance and new identification of pairs of alternatives. 
The final score of the alternatives is based on the aggregations through weighted sum of the partial 
utility above calculated.  
The choice among different alternatives is obtained comparing the total utility deriving from all 
impacts (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). The DM choice is structured as a ranking of different alternative 
(several landscape contracts design).  
 
 
4. Case study and empirical model 
 
The case study is located in the Agrarian Region “Bonifica Ferrarese Occidentale”, in Ferrara 
Province (Northern Italy). The area includes the Municipalities of Argenta, Berra, Copparo, 
Formignana, Jolanda di Savoia, Masi Torello, Portomaggiore, Ro, Tresigallo and Voghiera. The entire 
Agrarian Region is in plain, with the surface of 70,713 hectares and a number of farms of 3.630. 
Average UAA per farm is quite high compared to other Italian areas (19.23 ha).  
The objective of the simulations is the design of contracts for the productions of Measure 9 of rural 
development plans of Region Emilia Romagna (Introductions and maintenance of landscape 
elements). The present contract is characterized by 10 years of length with two levels of payment, 
2000 €/ha in the first five years (introduction) and 1000 €/ha in the second five years (maintenance). 
Possible landscape elements that can be produced are: hedgerows; small wood and ponds (Emilia 
Romagna, 2000). In the Ferrara provinces the area under landscape contract was 1,070 ha in the years 
2004 (Marchesi and Tinarelli, 2007). 
Farmers’ behaviour analysis is based on simulation to 10 different farm types
1. The simulations model 
is based on real option approach that can include the timing on which farmers can decided to invest 
(Dixit and Pyndic, 1994) and that can consider uncertainty in the prices of the agricultural products 
and in the amount of decoupled payments (Peerling and Polman, 2004). The timing and the possible 
actions of the farmer (A) and Regional Administration (P) is presented in Figure 2. 
                                                 
1 The farms were divided in 10 different types, crossing between crops specialisations (arable farming, fruit 
farming and vegetable farming) and farm surfaces (small, medium, medium-large, large).    8
 
Figure 2. Timing of contract 
 
The DM proposes a contract in the first (t1), in the second (t2) and in the third (t3) period. The 
contract is known by the farmers, and once revealed by P it maintains the same conditions. Periods 1 
and 2 have a length of one and period 3 has a length of height years. The model is developed using 
two stochastic variables: commodities and fruit price, and decoupled payments. The prices are 
stochastic in the second and in the third period and the amount of decoupled payments only in the third 
period. Contracts for the provision of landscape elements represent a specific investment, outside 
AESs contract the salvage value is equal to zero. As shown in Figure 2, the possible farmer’s choice 
can be four. Such a model can include the option to wait and to postpone the decision to invest in 
landscape elements in period t2 and t3. Situation one is generated when farmer realizes the investment 
in the first period and it keep the contract (possibly with lock-in) for both the second and the third, due 
to high specificity of investments realized. Otherwise the farmer can choose to wait and have more 
information about the future price before to invest in landscape in second period and remain looked-in 
for the third period (situation two). Finally the farmer can postpone the decision to the third period as a 
consequence of more information available about the future price and the amount of decoupled 
payments. If decisions to invest are realized in the third period its will generate situation three when 
the farmers accept to invest and situation four if the farmers do not realize the investment. The choice 
to invest in landscape elements is based on maximizing of the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
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stochastic in second and third period. Decoupled payments are know in the first and second period, but 
are stochastic in the third period.  
Formally the NPV is presented in equation 10. 
() () () 3 2 1
3
3 , 2 1 2 , 1 1 , ) 1 (
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With: 
Inv  = specific investment for productions of landscape elements; 
ea
h tc  = ex-ante transactions costs, specific for the AES contract; 
1 , = t hl π , 2 , = t hl π ,  3 , = t hl π  = profits obtained in the first and second period. 
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Where: 
t p = commodities and fruit price in the first and second period; 
aes
t c p ,  = payments for the productions of landscape elements (aes) under contract c; 
aes
t c s ,  = implementations cost of landscape contract; 
t s  = costs of commodities and fruit; 
t i  = yield of crops 
t pd  = single payment
2; 
θ  = stochastic value; 
t e l ;
aes
t c le , = external labour for the productions of commodities and fruit and for the provision of 
landscape elements under contract c; 
t f l ;
aes
t c lf ,  = family labour for the productions of commodities and fruit and for the provision of 
landscape elements under contract c; 
ep
t c tc ,  = ex-post transactions costs; 
r  = discount rate = 2%; 
3 , 2 , 1 = t  = period 1; period 2 and period 3; 
1 n , 2 n ,  3 n  = length of period 1 ,2 and 3. 
Farmers decide to participate in AESs through the executions of investment in landscape elements 
when NPV generated from a specific contract design is higher than without contract. Empirical 
simulations are based on the use of three separated models, including in different ways the uncertainty 
of price and singles payments in the second period and in the third period. 
The expected values of prices and payments have been drawn from a survey carried out in Emilia 
Romagna Region in 2006 among 81 farmers, concerning their expectations about the future and 
adapted to the rationale of this model (Table 1)
3. 
                                                 
2 Payments are guaranteed only if farmer maintain a number of right; landscape elements are not included in the 
rights and are competitive with the COP.   10
Table 1 Expected values of prices and payments. 
 Scenario  A  Scenario  B 
Prices of agricultural products 
Value in the of the scenario (actual=1)  1.06  0.81 
Probability 0.86  0.14 
Expected value (actual=1)  1.02 
Decoupled payments after 2013 
Value in the of the scenario (actual=1)  1.00  0.30 
Probability 0.52  0.48 





Results are presented in the following way: first the results of the simulations of farmers’ behaviour, 
expressed in terms of economic, social, and environmental impacts are shown in Table 2; secondly the 
weights of the DM obtained from the MCRID process are presented in Table 3; finally the value of 
utility obtained through weighted sum of all alternatives are showed in Table 4. 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 The survey was carried out as part of the project “Investment behaviour in conventional and emerging farming 
systems under different policy scenarios, CONTRACT 150369-2005 F1SC IT, call for tenders J05/13/2005, 
IPTS JRC Seville”.   11





































L_L  1,124,245  574,342 278,675 37,005  113,488  1,704 166  716 
L_A 1,133,856  666,043  501,708  37,250 113,358  1,704  195  853 
L_H  1,148,838 1,095,819 1,078,523 37,332  113,440 1,747  214  1,471 
A_L  1,144,173 1,092,867 1,094,727 37,332  112,253 1,747  195  1,487 
A_A  1,160,523 1,135,157 1,400,510 37,347  112,221 1,747  214  1,508 
A_H  1,177,135 1,476,673 2,273,158 37,334  112,241 1,752  214  2,148 
H_L  1,172,687 1,579,575 2,399,294 37,347  111,910 1,758  214  2,244 
H_A  1,190,005 1,935,459 3,287,539 37,347  109,249 1,807  265  2,599 
10% of the 
payments 
H_H  1,207,678 1,935,459 3,738,913 37,354  109,243 1,807  265  2,598 
L_L  1,098,997  642,300 183,957 55,601  129,949  1,562 166  589 
L_A 1,103,616  854,826  412,239  55,884 130,254  1,605  195  840 
L_H 1,109,760  899,911  586,916  55,993 130,996  1,704  214  890 
A_L  1,108,389 1,074,421 744,643  55,993 129,916  1,747  195  1,074 
A_A  1,115,503 1,116,711 950,020  56,009 129,884  1,747  214  1,094 
A_H  1,122,985 1,500,543 1,765,248 55,917  129,585 1,752  214  1,774 
H_L  1,122,781 1,605,070 1,922,114 56,052  129,112 1,758  214  1,872 
H_A  1,130,467 1,706,451 2,401,882 56,052  129,051 1,758  265  1,988 
20% of the 
payments 
H_H  1,138,683 1,926,200 3,025,645 56,084  126,552 1,801  265  2,195 
 
The results of simulations are presented for different scenario of private transactions costs, 
respectively 10% and 20% of payments. The Table 2 shows that changing contract design it is possible 
to generate different impacts for economics social and environmental criteria; however some 
indicators are more static than others, as both family and external labour and participants. With the 
higher payments, there is an increase in participation in landscape contracts, farms profits and the 
payments by local administration. Table 2 shows higher participation in landscape contract than the 
real participation. This is a consequence of the assumptions used in the model to maintain fix amount 
of private transactions costs for all farms simulated. Profit of the area is really sensible to the different 
contracts design options; changing contracts, it is possible to increase profit of the area more than 7% 
in the scenario of low transaction costs and more than 5% in the scenario with high transaction costs.  
Table 3 presents the results of weights elicitation, based on applications of the MCRID method.  
 
                                                 
4 In this table is present the code of alternatives, the first letter corresponds to the level of payments for the 
introductions and second one for the maintenance: A corresponds to the actual level of payments, L corresponds 
to 1000 €/ha less than the actual and H corresponds to 1000 €/ha more than the actual. 
5 In this table is omitted the column “Small woods”, because in simulation no farmer invested in this 
environmental landscape. However three has importance for the DM and its importance is quantified and used in 
following MCA.    12


































Minimization  0.0079 0.0067  0.0395  -  - 0.0541  -  -  0.8919 
Maximization  0.0327 0.0311  0.1557  0.0363  0.0550 0.1100 0.1509  0.2434  0.1850 
Central Value  0.0203 0.0189  0.0976  0.0181  0.0275 0.0820 0.0755  0.1217  0.5384 
 
DM shows differences in the perceptions of importance among indicators. The indicators with higher 
relevance belong to the set of environmental indicators, within which ponds has a particularly high 
value. Other indicators with high importance are participation and the reduction of payments. 
Indicators with less importance are family and external labour, that are not important for the aim of 
agri-environmental programs. 
The value of utility of the different contract designs for the DM is presented in Table 4 
Table 4 Outcome of the farmers’ behaviour simulations (impacts matrix for MCA) 








L_L 0.1087  0.1980  0.1533 
L_A 0.1180  0.1941  0.1561 
L_H 0.1635  0.1894  0.1764 
A_L 0.1646  0.1889  0.1767 
A_A 0.1641  0.1806  0.1723 
A_H 0.1663  0.2087  0.1875 
H_L 0.1643    0.2154  0.1899 
H_A 0.1458  0.2377  0.1918 
10% of the payments 
H_H 0.1327  0.2343  0.1835 
L_L 0.0979  0.1956  0.1467 
L_A 0.1162  0.1929  0.1546 
L_H 0.1196  0.1898  0.1547 
A_L 0.1333  0.1881  0.1607 
A_A 0.1331  0.1812  0.1571 
A_H 0.1634  0.1797  0.1716 
H_L 0.1595  0.1862  0.1728 
H_A 0.1442  0.1909  0.1676 
20% of the payments 
H_H 0.1260  0.2022  0.1641 
 
Different contract designs have very similar utility value. However, all alternatives in scenarios with 
low transaction costs have higher utility value than the same alternative in scenario with high 
transaction costs. 
The actual contract design (A_A) represents an alternative with high relative utility in both scenarios. 
However higher utility can be obtained with different contract design among the two scenarios. In 
scenarios with low amount of private transactions costs (10%), utility for the DM can be higher 
(+12%), increasing the payments in the period of introductions (alternative H_A). In scenario of high   13
amount of private transaction costs (20%) utility greater of 7.5% can be generated by different 





Combining a land allocations model with multicriteria analysis it was possible to set-up an exhaustive 
ex-ante evaluation able to simulate the impact of different contract design options and to create a 
ranking of such options. The results show that relevant opportunities to increase utility for the DM are 
available with new contract designs. Furthermore comparing the two scenarios of amount of private 
transaction costs, it was possible to identify relevant opportunity for increase efficiency of the contract 
acting on such parameter. The uncertainties about market price and the future of decoupled payments 
have strong relations with the realizations of landscape elements, emphasised by the specificity of the 
investments in landscape elements and the competitions in land use between decoupled payments and 
the agri-environmental schemes. 
The option to wait and postpone the decision to invest, prerogative of real options models, allows to 
consider that it is possible to increase participation in agri-environmental schemes over time, as 
uncertainty about prices and policies conditions is reduced. Furthermore, the reduction of the private 
transaction costs represents an important way for increasing participation in agri-environmental 
schemes, which can be realized also with a process of learning by farmers.  
Multicriteria analysis is used to aggregate impacts of many criteria, including not only the effects on 
the environment, but also economic and social impacts, in particular when there are important trade-
offs between criteria. Through the weighing of criteria it was possible to quantify the preference of the 
DM and aggregate with a common metric the impact for the different criteria. This process allows to 
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